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Social Policies for Social Polities:
How Conditional Cash Transfers are
Undermining Traditional Patrons in
Northeast Brazil
Les politiques sociales pour les entités sociales : comment les transferts
conditionnels en espèces sapent le clientélisme traditionnel dans le nord-est du
Brésil
Lorenzo Daïeff
“To any planned, built, or legislated form of social
life, one may apply a comparable test: to what
degree does it promise to enhance the skills,
knowledge, and responsibility of those who are
part of it?”
— James C. Scott, Seeing like a State (1998:355)
 
1. Introduction
1 This edition of the journal looks into recent poverty-reduction strategies over the course
of the last decade in Latin America. It asks which policies have helped countries in their
fight against poverty. In particular,  it  concerns itself with Conditional Cash Transfers
(CCTs), a set of social programs which award parents below given poverty lines regular
cash grants upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, usually regular school attendance
and health check-ups for their children. CCTs have been prominent – and indeed, some
might say dominant – on the continent over the past decade. What are their results and
impacts on vulnerable populations?
2 This  paper  approaches  this  question  from  the  perspective  of  political-democratic
citizenship.  The question of citizenship is the question of who is included and how in
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society, and goes beyond the question of material poverty, although they are related.
Inclusion, in turn, can be variously interpreted, but is here understood mainly in the
limited  sense  of  autonomous  political  participation  in  democratic  proceedings.  The
question asked in this paper is whether fighting poverty – through CCTs – can also have
beneficial impacts on the citizenry.
3 Latin American politics – including the country of focus in this article, Brazil – has long
been beset by a common practice: that the few, rich and powerful, purchase and control
the votes of the many, poor and marginalised, by dispensing personalised favours. This
practice, known as clientelism, biases electoral results, disenfranchises large sectors of
the population,  entrenches inequities,  and undermines democratic accountability and
competition.
4 The  literature  on  clientelism  has  argued  that  economic  development  gradually
undermines clientelism, and that it does so largely by reducing the poverty of clients
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Indeed, it is widely
accepted that  it  is  material  necessity that  drives the poor’s  dependence on patrons.1
However,  economic  development  does  not  always  or  automatically  reduce  poverty,
despite general correlations established in the econometric literature (cf. Dollar & Kraay
2002).  Growth  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  strategies  and  policies  –  including  social
policies – in order to be widely distributed. If certain social policies can contribute to
poverty-reduction,  then can they contribute to undermining clientelism, and thereby
strengthening citizenship? The 'transitions-from-clientelism’-literature cited above has
paid limited attention to this question.
5 The  ‘political  effects  of  social  policies’-literature,  however,  has  long  recognised  that
policies can make – or ‘break’ – democratic citizens. As Smith and Ingram (1993:15) note:
“It  is  usually  believed  that  in  a  democracy  citizens  shape  policies.  It  is  less
commonly realized that  the far-reaching policies  of  modern governments shape
citizens.  […]  Citizenship  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  in  the  modern  state,  but
instead must be nurtured by good policy designs.”
6 However, current Latin American debates about social policy have largely focussed on the
concern  that  programs  like  CCTs  aggravate  rather  than  alleviate  clientelism  and
inequality. In particular, conditional cash transfers have been attacked on two grounds.
First,  for  allegedly  being  a  new way of  exchanging  cash  for  votes  and undermining
political accountability and competition (Hunter & Power 2007; Soares & Terron 2008;
Zucco 2008); and second, for making citizens dependent, lazy, and anaemic in economic
and political terms (Hall 2008), thus facilitating their control, entrenching their poverty,
and preventing ‘real’ change (Oxhorn 2011).
7 These debates are complex and multi-faceted. General supporters of CCTs, for instance,
reject  the  idea  that  social  assistance  buys  votes  or  disincentivises  recipients  from
working,  but do fear that its  ‘neoliberal’,  individualistic nature may undermine their
willingness  to  collectively  mobilise  for  political  change (e.g.  Ansell,  2014;  Grimes &
Wängnerud  2010;  Martins  2004).  General  opponents  of  CCTs,  in  turn,  worry
beneficiaries  will  give up on productive activities,  but  believe them quite  capable  of
turning up in large amounts to support those who finance their cheques (e.g., Hall 2008).
Both sides’ perspectives are contradictory, and somewhat perplexing.
8 This article does not cover all  aspects of the issue, but constitutes a think piece that
introduces the idea that social  policies such as CCTs can play a part in the “difficult
transition from clientelism to citizenship” (Fox 1994) in Latin America.  To do so,  the
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paper draws upon existing scholarship as well as upon 29 original interviews conducted
in 2014 in Recife,  Pernambuco,  with recipients of  the Brazilian Bolsa Família program
(Family Grant), the world’s largest CCT.2
9 Recife was chosen for several reasons: both Recife and the Northeast share clientelistic
histories  (Montambeault  2009;  Montero  2010);  51.5%  of  BF  beneficiaries  live  in  the
Northeast; and over 80% of Brazilians live in urban areas and 51% live in municipalities of
100.000  or  more.3 Institutional  support  from  Recife’s  Municipal  Social  Assistance
Secretariat  and  from  the  Federal  University  of  Pernambuco  further  facilitated  the
research on the ground. Interviews proceeded in two neighbourhoods chosen for their
contrasting locations and histories, as well as in the main Bolsa Família registration site in
Recife. Interviewee selection relied on the assistance of local informants (e.g. nurse, NGO
worker,  civil  servants)  who were not  present at  the interviews.  These lasted from 25
minutes to two hours, and broadly discussed beneficiaries’ attitudes towards the Bolsa
Família  and  politics,  as  well  as  daily  lives  and  most  common  sources  of  assistance.
Interviews were then transcribed and analysed for relevant themes and patterns.
10 Like  any methodology,  the  above  possesses  its  own limitations.  In  terms of  internal
validity, interviewees may be reluctant to speak openly about their lives and about illegal
processes like clientelism. Indirect questions and confidentiality were thus used as partial
mitigation  measures.  Additionally,  because  qualitative  research  involves  a  lot  of
guesswork  and  re-interpretation,  the  empirical  findings  should  be  read  as  but  a
‘researcher’s perspective’ on a ‘client’s perspective’; or, as Bourdieu (1990) puts is, as “a
point of view on a point of view”. In turn, in terms of external validity, interviewees were
too few (albeit diverse) to form a representative sample of Recife’s, much less Brazil’s
population,  an  issue  compounded  by  the  regional  particularities  of  the  Northeast’s
clientelistic history. This article’s insights therefore cannot claim to accurately describe
CTs in other contexts; but it does at least claim to provide an exploratory approach to
understanding  a  potentially  powerful,  and  so  far  understudied,  mechanism  in  the
undoing  of  clientelism  and  the  construction  of  citizenship.  This  empirical  strategy
leaning on Weber’s (1949) idea of Verstehen: by better understanding what is happening in
the lives of a very specific set of Bolsa Família beneficiaries in Recife, we develop the tools
to  better  interpret  the  lives  of  other  beneficiaries,  of  other  CCTs,  elsewhere.  The
conclusion of the paper returns to the broader question of CCTs’ effects beyond Brazil.
11 The rest of the text proceeds in three parts. First, it briefly argues that CCTs like the Bolsa
Família should not themselves be considered clientelistic on any reasonable definition of
the term. The article then turns to the reverse hypothesis:  if  the Bolsa Família is  not
clientelistic but a genuine help to its beneficiaries, can it perhaps help them to leave
behind their ‘familiar bosses’? Can it contribute to a gradual weakening of clientelism, as
some (Hunter & Sugiyama 2009; Rêgo & Pinzani 2013a) have suggested it might? The
paper identifies some evidence in favour of that hypothesis, before cautiously suggesting
that the evidence remains too tentative and preliminary for definite conclusions. In the
final part, the text overcomes the question of clientelism to reflect more broadly upon
what kind of citizenship the Bolsa Família currently promotes, and in so doing emphasises
both positive aspects and current limitations.
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2. Recapitulation: Why the Bolsa Família is not
Clientelistic
12 Early after the Bolsa Família’s inception, a debate emerged regarding whether CCTs were
nothing but a new form of clientelism, in two possible senses explained below: by intent,
or by accident. Later authors, however, have since rejected or revised that assessment on
both counts (cf. Daïeff 2015a, where I explain at some length why the program cannot be
considered  clientelistic).  This  section  briefly  recapitulates  these  debates  and  their
conclusions.
13 In the first sense, CCTs were suspected of being clientelistic by their very logic, in that
they may have been designed to consolidate an electoral clientele and to ‘buy’ political
support from the poor. In Brazil, such suspicions emerged largely after President Lula’s
2006  re-election,  which  witnessed  a  significant  shift  in  his  electoral  base  from  the
wealthier South to the more impoverished Northeast. Because the Northeast was also the
region with most Bolsa Família cash transfers recipients, and because it turned out that
the roll-out  of  the  program accelerated just  three months  before  the elections  (Hall
2008:806),  commentators were quick to suspect  that  the Bolsa Família may have been
politically  motivated.  Early  analyses  indeed  confirmed  that  the  Bolsa  Família had
generated significant  electoral  payoffs  (Hunter  & Power 2007;  Soares  & Terron 2008;
Zucco 2008). However, concerns about political manipulation of the program to electoral
ends were later alleviated by evidence that the distribution of the Bolsa Família mapped
‘objective  need’  closely  (Fenwick  2009;  Rodrigues-Silveira  2011;  Fried  2012).  The
accelerated rolling out of the Bolsa Família thus ultimately only served to incorporate
those  who  indeed  had  a  right  to  the  transfer.  The  Bolsa  Família did,  of  course,  still
generate electoral returns, but given the widespread approval of the program,4 scholars
began to wonder how one might more clearly distinguish between retrospective support
(which rewards politicians for good performance in office, and is perceived as legitimate)
and  clientelistic  support  (which  thanks  politicians  for  private  gifts  and  is  seen  as
illegitimate). Zucco (2013) thus investigated whether the electoral gains from the Bolsa
Família endured across elections (indicating an electoral clientele), or whether they faded
over time (suggesting standard retrospective voting). Seeing as they did fade, Zucco –
who had himself initially claimed that “Bolsa Família is a […] way to ‘buy’ votes” (2008:48)
– was forced to conclude that “[T]here is evidence that CCTs have not created ‘partisan
clienteles’… In this context, CCTs do not seem like a tool with which to build overall
political  dominance” (2013:820).  Evidence from another large CCT-program in Mexico
confirms this  ‘programmatic’  interpretation (De la  O 2013;  Stokes  et  al.  2013;  Weitz-
Shapiro 2014).
14 In the second sense, CCTs were suspected of being clientelistic by a perversion of their
logic, in the sense that local patrons may capture or divert the programs, and use their
resources to strengthen their own clientelistic networks. After all, as programmatic as
the Bolsa Família might be, “It would certainly not be the first time in Brazil’s history that
federal government transfers were turned into grist for patronage at sub-national levels”
(Hunter and Sugiyama 2009:13). Moreover, factors like past legacies of clientelism, the
poverty  of  beneficiaries,  and  the  discretion  of  municipal  officials  in  beneficiary
registration and monitoring seemed to provide fertile ground for abuses. Some instances
of  corruption  and  attempted  vote-buying  inevitably  occurred  and  were  avidly
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documented  by  the  media  (Lindert  and  Vincensini  2010).  That  notwithstanding,
subsequent  research  ultimately  again  largely  dispelled  concerns:  in  an  article  titled
“Whither Clientelism”, Sugiyama and Hunter (2013:30) report that beneficiaries do not
perceive  the  Bolsa  Família to  be  distributed  according  to  political  criteria,  even  in
environments  which are otherwise rife  with vote-buying.  The authors’  conclusion is,
accordingly, encouraging:
“In  sum,  we  found  consistent  evidence  that  the  Bolsa  Família provides  tangible
benefits  to  the  poor  without  subjecting  them to  manipulation by  local  political
patrons or arguably even to concerns of such a prospect occurring.”
15 In addition to the above literature, in-depth interviews I conducted with Bolsa Família-
beneficiaries sought to further explore the relationship between the Bolsa Família and
clientelism. Although a variety of opinions were expressed on any given topic, the general
picture that emerged from the discussions further confirms the findings above:  Bolsa
Família beneficiaries did not appear to uniformly think or act in ways that marked them
out as ‘clients’. Instead, many saw the program as a right instead of a favour, and thus did
not ‘reciprocate’ for the cash (cf. Daïeff 2015a). Moreover, they felt the Bolsa Família was
distributed fairly, without political interference by local patrons or party representatives
(ibid).
16 Overall, the Bolsa Família is not clientelistic in either of the two possible senses discussed
above. Some scholars have thus started to wonder what other kinds of ‘political’ impacts
the program might have on beneficiaries.  After all,  as Campbell  (2003) has argued in
relation to the American welfare state, “Policies make citizens” – or ‘break’ them, for that
matter.  But  if  policy  design  matters,  then  what  are  the  Bolsa  Família’s  effects?  In
considering this issue, scholars have let their questions be guided by their dichotomies: if
the  Bolsa  does  not  ‘break’  citizens  through  clientelism,  might  it  ‘make’  citizens  by
breaking clientelism?5
 
3. Might the Bolsa Família erode Clientelism?
17 In order to understand whether and how the Bolsa Família interacts with clientelism, one
must first establish if and how patrons interact with program beneficiaries. A large part
of the interviews was dedicated to this task, and this section starts by a review of the
matter.
18 So far in this paper, clientelism has been treated as one general phenomenon in which
patrons’ favours elicit clients’ support. However, clientelism can come in many shapes or
forms. For present purposes, one can differentiate between two main versions of it: (a)
spot exchanges, and what I call (b) “diffuse loyalty”. The most prominent example of a
spot exchange is vote-buying: money is exchanged against the (immediate) promise of a
vote, which is fulfilled at a given date via a given action. Other examples include paying
somebody to attend a political rally. Diffuse loyalty, in turn, involves a more continuous
relationship which generally hinges upon an implicit promise of mutual assistance.6
19 What spot exchanges and diffuse loyalties have in common – what makes them both
clientelistic – is, first, that they usually involve a richer patron and a poorer client, and
secondly that the patron usually provides material support in exchange of the client’s
political  support.  As  such,  they  are  both  usually  considered  means  of  segmenting,
coopting, and disenfranchising the poor, who end up voting for the candidate with the
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most  particularistic  resources to  distribute,  rather  than  with  the  best  intentions,
programs, or public projects (Escobar 1992).7 Clientelism, in short, entrenches inequality,
and makes poor communities dependent upon a series of patrons, rather than upon their
collective agency. It is thus deleterious to citizenship.
20 However,  spot  exchanges  and diffuse  loyalties  are  also different,  in  significant  ways.
Oneis  their  legality:  vote-buying is  generally  illegal,  but  assisting a  family  with food
without explicitly demanding anything in return is not. A second difference is how clients
perceive the interactions: spot exchanges are acts in which clients may be conscious of
what they are trading away. Diffuse loyalty, however, may often not be conceived of as an
exchange,  since the payoffs  are differed and unspecified.  Instead,  the patron may be
thought  of  as  a  friend,  or  simply  as  a  helpful  and fortunate  relation;  many patrons
actively portray themselves (to others and themselves) as benevolent and hard-working
‘for the people’ (Auyero 2001).8 This directly leads to the third difference between spot
exchanges and diffuse loyalties: their observability for the researcher. Spot exchanges,
such  as  vote-buying,  are  individual  events  whose  occurrence  can  be  discussed  and
evaluated in frequency; diffuse loyalties, in turn, are hard to measure, and difficult to
capture in an interview (the best sociological accounts rely on ethnography of a given
community, cf. Auyero 2001). Consequently, explicit discussions of clientelism during the
interviews concentrated on spot exchanges, and specifically vote-buying. For brevity’s
sake, we concentrate on the latter below.
21 Regarding vote-buying, interviewees in general agreed on two main points. First, most
freely acknowledged that vote-buying was a common practice in their neighbourhood.9
Second, with rare exceptions, all roundly condemned the practice and rejected partaking
in it.10 But if everybody is (professedly) against it, who sells their vote, and why? For this
apparent paradox most beneficiaries put the blame on others around them, and gave one
of three explanations:
1. It is a matter of character (or ‘culture’, or ‘education’): some people always want more, or
have no education and do not know their rights, or have no scruples.
2. Vote-buying does not work: voting is secret, so one might as well take the money and then
vote the way one wants to anyway.11
3. It is a matter of necessity: people are poor and need the money from their vote.
22 Can, then, the Bolsa Família diminish the incidence of vote-buying and -selling? Inasmuch
as vote-selling is a matter of necessity, it might. After all, if one lives in an environment
where most people disapprove of the practice, there is a social cost to selling one’s vote.
Moreover, as Ansell (2014) explains, it is stigmatising to reveal one’s neediness, one of the
signs of which is that one is reduced to degrading ‘spot exchanges’. In this context, the
increased income security and reduced misery afforded by the Bolsa Família may make a
real difference: now that one can afford to eat and that one knows that money is coming
next month, there may be less of a need to be loyal to a local patron, and still less to sell
one’s vote for 20, 30, or 50 Reais every few years. Indeed, interviewees stressed that the
Bolsa Família’s predictability and regularity mattered greatly:
“Before,  when something  was  lacking,  we couldn’t  even...  sometimes  his  dad is
unemployed, his dad... [So] it already helps that I can rely, right, on this money. It’s
sure money that I know will be there every month, that won’t be missing”* (Isabela)
12
“Every month, every month we know that it’s there, every month it helps, is good.
Rain or sunshine, it is there [‘Faça chuva ou faça sol, está ali’]”* (Elisabeth)
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“So you already feel calmer [‘mais sossegado’], you already know that it’s on a given
day, a day that’s guaranteed... you already know you’ve got your money there for
sure, from the government.”* (Jose)
23 Along similar lines argues the Brazilian scholar Walquíria Rêgo, who recently published a
book about her interviews with Bolsa Família beneficiaries in rural areas (Rêgo & Pinzani
2013a). When interviewed in the Folha de S. Paulo, a major Brazilian daily, Rêgo argued
that the program weakened clientelism (or, as it is called in the Brazilian Northeast, ‘
coronelismo’, in reference to traditional ‘coronels’, i.e. colonels, bosses, patrons):
“The colonel lost weight because she [Bolsa Família beneficiary] acquired a freedom
she did not have. She does not need to go to the mayor. She can ask for a better
street, but not food, which is the way coronelismo worked.”*13
24 Several parts of Rêgo’s statement are of interest here, including the idea that Brazilians
now have the liberty to buy their own food. Indeed, both external data and my interviews
confirmed that  Brazil  has made significant progress in terms of  food security in the
course of the past decade. As an interviewed doctor working on the poor outskirts of
Recife recounted to me, when the Bolsa Família was launched in 2003 she used to see many
malnourished children.  Ten years on,  she sees them no more,  and hunger has fallen
dramatically. Indeed, according to Tereza Campello, the Minister for Social Development
and the Fight against Hunger (MDS), the number of undernourished Brazilians fell by 82%
between 2002 and 2012 (Gomes 2014).  The Food and Agriculture Organization of  the
United Nations (FAO) further stresses that in Brazil “the decrease in food insecurity was
greater  among  people  living  in  extreme  poverty”  (FAO  2014:23;  IBGE  2010).  Whilst
economic growth and other policies have helped in this regard, cash transfers have been
an important part of the state’s food and nutrition policy: the Bolsa Família “currently
accounts  for  approximately  one-third  of  Federal  expenditures  on  food  security  and
nutrition” (FAO 2014:24). Indeed, interviewees considered the program key to the change
in their lives:
“These families, in the past, we saw the reports on television, on the radio ... saw
that  many  malnourished  children  died  ...  A  lot  of  terrible  suffering,  terrible
suffering ...  because before there was no government program to help and they
didn’t even have their own food ...  Many families just went hungry. They didn’t
even sleep, because there wasn’t, really, anything to eat ... Nowadays, thank God, it
has improved a lot ... now, this income means that they have the basics.”* (Lenira) 
“There’s one [neighbour], I think he doesn’t get the Bolsa Família, no... That’s why I
think he goes hungry, you see”* (Karina) 
“These days many people go hungry, but not that many given that help from the
government,  because many… There, where I  live,  there are mothers with seven,
eight children. They are in need, but not as much because they know that at the end
of the month they will receive that money”* (Lucilene) 
25 Indeed,  food  purchases  were  the  most  frequently  cited  use  of  Bolsa  Família cash  in
interviews. This reduction in hunger goes hand in hand with a stark reduction in poverty
(FAO 2014:23-24): 
“Overall poverty fell from 24.3 percent to 8.4 percent of the population between
2001 and 2012, while extreme poverty dropped from 14.0 percent to 3.5 percent. […]
An additional 22.1 million Brazilians have been lifted out of extreme poverty since
2011.”14 
26 When asked how families lived before the program, Cristina spoke for many when she
bluntly  stated:  "Boy...  let’s  put  it  like  that,  they  suffered  necessity  [‘passavam
necessidade’]".
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27 Where ‘poor people’s lives’ change so starkly, changes in ‘poor people’s politics’ are likely
to follow suit. Indeed, when asked, some beneficiaries reckoned that the Bolsa Família had
reduced the frequency of vote-buying. In order to understand this a little better, we turn
to an excerpt of a conversation with Roselia, a 28-year-old single mother of five with four
years of schooling and six years of Bolsa Família transfers (R$370/month at the time of the
interview).  As  she emphasises,  candidates  usually  cunningly target  the poorest  areas
because  they  know  that  destitute  citizens  will  sell  their  vote  against  small,  one-off
benefits, even though these gifts will leave them hungry again the next day:
Question: You said that politicians come, make promises... Now I don’t know if this
happens in your neighbourhood, but do they sometimes even promise money or
jobs?
Roselia: Yes, yes, they promise.
Q: And is there any vote-buying?
R:  There is,  there is.  Everybody knows this.  Now everybody keeps quiet on this,
right, like, that the politicians go, offer money for you to vote. He arrives like that
in a community that he sees, he knows, they are rascals [‘malandros’].  They are
rascals. He arrives in a community, like that, let’s assume that there are only houses
on stilts [‘palafita’], people in great need. [...] There they make promises, give food
packages [‘dão cesta básica’], give money for cooking gas, and buy a vote. Because
there,  that  person,  what  is  she?  Ne-e-dy.  [‘Ne-ce-ssi-ta-da’].  That  person  there
needs cooking gas.  [...]  ‘I  need gas’… and you, ‘hey, Dona Rose.  Hey, here is the
money for the gas. But you will  vote for me’.  ‘Aaah, I’m in great need, with my
children, I don’t have food’… ‘Hey, Dona Rose, here’s a food package’. Only that this
will fix you up once [‘suprir’], it won’t be for life. There are a lot of people who don’t
understand that.
Q: Fix you up?
R: Fix up… the need, in that hour. […] After that, it’s over! O-ver. [‘A-ca-bou’]. He
doesn’t even put a foot back in the community, because he knows the community is
in need, he knows that he got a few nice votes, because he gave food, he gave gas...*
28 When asked, however, Roselia expressed the belief that the Bolsa Família undermined the
influence of politicians, because the government now ‘covers some needs’:
Q: And do you think that, now that some people have the Bolsa Família, the politician
has less influence, because people already have...? 
R: Yes, yes. For sure. Now you get to the point... They definitely have less influence,
because of the government, which is already meeting some need. They can come, of
course they can come, say like that, I want to give you this much for your vote, and
you have to give me the number of  your voting card.  There… it’s  up to you to
accept, yes or no. Of course, we choose what we want and don’t want, of course, for
our life. Like good things, bad things... we decide, right? But I think, see, that they
don’t have as much influence as they used to have. Thank God! That they don’t have
as much influence as they used to have… Back in the time of my mother, of my
grand-parents… I think they had more influence. Because there wasn’t this project,
this, the Bolsa Família, it didn’t exist, so the situation was precarious.*
29 Now that some of  the poorest  receive the Bolsa Família,  Roselia suggests,  the gifts  of
politicians are less needed, or anyway carry less weight. Interestingly, a similar view was
expressed  by  the  president  of  a  neighbourhood  association,  in  the  midst  of  our
conversation about the Bolsa Família. Neighbourhood associations are usually closely tied
to political parties, and are an established part of the Northeastern clientelistic machine
(Ansell, 2014). As the president recounted to me, he discontinued certain food gifts after
the Bolsa Família eliminated the need for them:
Question: So, about the Bolsa Família. …
Social Policies for Social Polities: How Conditional Cash Transfers are Under...
Revue Interventions économiques, 56 | 2016
8
Respondent: Bolsa Família, I am in favour of the Bolsa Família. I am in favour. I am in
favour of the Bolsa Família because here, end of the year, myself and my son, we
used  to  get  together  and  buy  some  food  to  give  people.  Nowadays,  the  people
receive [‘as pessoas ganham’]. They receive their money... even though it’s little,
but they receive it.
Q: So they don’t need the food anymore?
R: No. You see. Because the people aren’t in need [‘passando necessidade’].*
30 That the leader is in favour of the Bolsa Família suggests, encouragingly, that he cares
more about his community’s welfare than about the electoral return on his favours. Yet
the same leader later explained that he helped higher-up candidates gather votes, and
the food gifts at Christmas were presumably one of many means to sustain the loyalty of
poor voters.15 That the Bolsa Família undermined this practice is, then, but one example of
the way in which it changes poor people’s politics: not dramatically – since the leader still
asks  his  followers  for  votes  –  but  by  reducing voters’  material  dependence  on their
broker. Citizens might still accept food, if it is offered to them; but since they are less
hungry, these gifts may only impress a limited gratitude on their conscience.
31 However, both Roselia’s and the leader’s accounts,  though telling, are not necessarily
representative of the general spirit of the interviews. In particular, although many Bolsa
Família beneficiaries indeed mentioned changes in their material lives, most nonetheless
suggested that the Bolsa Família had had no effect on vote-buying whatsoever. This is
either because they thought that one might well  take both the Bolsa Família and the
politician’s  money;  or  because  they considered vote-buying a  matter  of  character  or
education, which the Bolsa Família would not be able to transform:
[Question asked: do you think the Bolsa Família led to a reduction in vote-selling?]
“I think it didn’t change much, that didn’t happen, no. People continue with that
mentality, that gaining something when the time comes is good. It still exists.”* (
Lenira)
“It’s difficult to change that, no? Because it’s like this, it isn’t even the Bolsa Família,
it’s the human head, that human head is complicated, right, the more it has the
more it wants. So that’s a flaw in humans.”* (Cristina)
“But even like that [with the Bolsa Família]... the people still... they could receive up
to 2-3 minimum wages, and they’d go after [politicians]… Because, that’s how it is:
the Brazilian has this habit.”* (Aldenine)
32 Consequently, although some interviewees did indeed notice a decrease in vote-buying
over the years, they attributed this squarely to increased monitoring and punishment of
the practice by the electoral commission in recent elections (cf. Nichter 2011b):
“It happened in the past as well, it happened a lot. These days, if they do it, they are
arrested. But they do it, hidden. Around here, on Election Day, they circulate, the
police, everything. If caught you’re arrested.”* (Edeleuza) 
“These days it’s  more difficult.  [...]  Vote-buying these days is  already more,  it’s
already tighter,  they are more organized on this  front...  He [the politician]  can
prejudice  himself.  In  the  election.  Because  of  that,  there’s  a  risk.  To  lose  your
mandate... Up to now... up to now it’s making progress, you see, it’s getting better
step by step”* (Jose)
33 In so responding, many beneficiaries unknowingly mirrored the arguments of one of the
most outspoken critics of the thesis that the Bolsa Família has undermined clientelism in
the  Northeast.  In  a  series  of  articles,  Alfred  P.  Montero  (2010;  2012)  uses  aggregate
electoral  data  to  track  the  progress  of  leftist  parties  across  various  states  of  the
Northeast, which he takes as a measure of how strongly coronelismo – the traditional hold
of  conservative  parties  over  poor  voters  –  is  receding.  He  shows  that  conservatives
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retained many rural areas full of Bolsa Família-beneficiaries, and thus questions the ability
of  the  Bolsa  Família to  undermine  enduring  networks  of  patronage.  Mirroring
explanations  found  in  the  interviews,  Montero  on  the  one  hand  concedes  that,
theoretically, the Bolsa Família“obviates the need for the poor to turn to local clientele
networks since they are no longer prodded to do so by necessity” (2010:118); but he goes
on to reject that argument because “It is plausible that voters […] will maximize their
income by taking federal support and the governor’s patronage” (p.119). And though his
figures do reveal progress by the left in cities, Montero argues that this was not the Bolsa
Família’s  work,  but  instead  caused  by  increased  grassroots  activism  by  urban  leftist
activists. He thus concludes, along with a majority of the interviewed beneficiaries, that
the Bolsa Família did not significantly and independently reduce vote-buying.
34 The  quantitative-electoral  evidence,  however,  is  mixed.  Whereas  Montero  finds  no
correlation between the distributions of the Bolsa Família and of the leftist vote share in
the Northeast, Borges (2007; 2011) finds a relationship, despite using similar datasets,
variables  and estimations.  The  latter  thus  credits  the  Bolsa  Família with  the  reduced
dominance of conservatives in the Northeast, as does Llyod (2012).
35 In the absence of its own data, this study cannot, unfortunately, adjudicate the debate
about the exact effect of the Bolsa Família on the extension and intensity of clientelistic
networks. Opinions on the matter diverge, be it between scholars such as Rêgo, Montero,
and  Borges,  who  have  carried  out  studies  of  the  program,  or  between  beneficiaries
themselves. What is almost certain, however, is that vote-buying has diminished over the
years, just as coronelismo is itself not what it used to be.16The reasons for this certainly
partly pertain to Brazil’s general economic transformation, as Montero (2010) is keen to
stress; but they equally certainly pertain to the striking revamping and extension of the
Brazilian welfare state,  which goes much beyond the Bolsa Família,  and in some ways
started with the 1988 constitution.17 After all, as the Brazilian scholar Elisa P. Reis already
argued back then: “the burocratization of power and the extension of social benefits to the campo
constitute a process of nation-building, through which a new social identity forms that substitutes
those traditionally based on local loyalty” (Reis 1988:203-4).18 Indeed, Stokes et al.’s (2013:231)
account of the transformation of the ‘American electorate’ over decades can easily be
read as describing contemporary Brazil:
“The American electorate of the later twentieth and twenty-first centuries […] is
unlike that of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which had nowhere to
turn but to party agents and the charitable organizations, in search of transfers or
protection  from  risk.  Now  government  fulfils  these  functions.  Isolated
manipulations  of  programs […]  notwithstanding,  the  vast  majority  of  the  social
spending by governments at all levels in the United States, especially that going to
individual  beneficiaries,  is  constrained by rules,  means tests,  and other abstract
formulae.”19
36 Before closing this section, it is worth noting two further factors which, although not
fully elaborated on here for reasons of space, are relevant to whether the Bolsa Família can
undermine historical patterns of clientelism (a more comprehensive treatment is found
in Daïeff 2015b). On the one hand, because vote-buying was more prominently discussed
in the interviews, this article has focussed on spot exchanges rather than diffuse loyalty.
However, it may be more difficult to undermine diffuse loyalty than to undermine spot
exchanges,  because  the  former  involve  not  just  material  gains  (although  they  are
grounded in that) but also trust, friendship, and, potentially, fun: patrons may sponsor
local festivities, trips to the sea, or even drug consumption (Auyero 1999). If this is the
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case,  the  Bolsa  Família may  struggle  to  ‘compete’  with  patrons.  On  the  other  hand,
however, the paper has only focussed on material ways in which the Bolsa Família might
undermine clientelism: namely, by reducing poverty. However, as Reis’ quote suggests,
social programs can also have psychological effects on beneficiaries. If so, the fact that
clientelism is partly a character trait, as interviewees claimed, need not signify that the
Bolsa Família cannot undermine it. The next section turns to these wider psychological
effects – good or bad.
 
4. Social Policy and Citizenry
37 To date, two lessons have emerged from the above: first,  that the Bolsa Família is not
clientelistic  –  but  second,  that  it  cannot  definitely  be  shown to  eliminate  patronage
networks, either. Does it, then, have no effect whatsoever on the political realities of its
beneficiaries? Not necessarily.  Several authors have suggested that,  beyond reshaping
clientelism, the Bolsa Família directly affects citizenship. For instance, in the quote above,
Reis (Reis 1988:203-4) argues that new social programs “constitute a process of nation-
building, through which a new social identity forms”. But which new social identity?
38 Conditional Cash Transfers may transform recipients’ view of the state, and of their and
its duties, through two broad means. The first, more tangible, are the ‘conditionalities’. As
Recife’s former Bolsa Família administrator noted in an interview, although CCTs prima
facie impose state conditionalities on beneficiaries, this in return requires the state to
provide said services: 
“What happened is that the program generated these obligations for you. When you
obligate the throwing of kids into school, the government auto-obligates itself to
have space in school, to open new schools, to contract new teachers.”*
39 Moreover, obligations create in beneficiaries an expectation that these services be of an
appropriate quality; and where they are not, many interviewees in Recife stressed the
importance of insisting on and claiming their rights, or ‘cobrar’ in Portuguese:
“Mothers go there, to know why the teacher was absent, why he didn’t come. And
he says,  he was ill,  something...  When the kids come without homework,  we go
there  to  know  why  they  don’t  have  homework,  because  it’s  the  teacher’s
responsibility to give homework”* (Rosana) 
“If somebody messes with my rights I’m going to go run after them, no?”* (Cristina)
40 In  other  words,  CCTs’  conditionalities  can  create  a  feedback  loop  of  bottom-up
accountability for better social services, an essential component of citizenship. Whilst it is
not possible to directly attribute this insistence on one’s rights to the Bolsa Família, studies
in other contexts have similarly suggest that social service quality was engaged by the
‘empowerment’ of CCT beneficiaries, who became more inclined to monitor and complain
about bad clinics (Barber & Gertler,  2009).  To quote the Recife’s  former Bolsa Família
administrator once more:
“The  question  is,  but  without  this  benefit,  would  there  be  this  insistence  on
education? Probably not, because their preoccupation would be to survive!”
41 Beyond conditionalities,  CCTs may transform recipients’  view of  the sense in a more
diffuse manner, by creating a broader sense of social inclusion. For instance, Sugiyama
and Hunter (2013) concluded from focus groups with Bolsa Família beneficiaries that “[t]he
sense of social inclusion that the program has created was strikingly evident”. In turn,
from their interviews with very poor recipients in rural areas of Brazil, Rêgo and Pinzani
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(2013:362b)  came  back  convinced  that  the  Bolsa  Família enhanced  the  dignity  and
autonomy of recipients:
“The German sociologist Georg Simmel [...] showed that money possesses liberating
aspects, because it introduces, even in minimal amounts, the abilities of choosing
and desiring to people. It is endowed with strong symbolical functions, since it turns
its owners into ‘more determined persons’, more respectable and respected in a
world dominated by mercantile relationships; it makes them better able to decide
their lives, and, therefore, more equal to others. Finally, it frees individuals from
personal  ties  of  economic  dependence  (on  their  family  or  other  people).  The
economist  Amartya Sen theorises  that  people’s  liberty  hinges  on their  range of
concrete  options  which  allow them to  realise  actions  or  reach  states  that  they
consider valuable […]. These options depend not only on individual capacities, but
also on the material conditions in which people live. When these conditions change,
so do the possibilities to make their lives more free and autonomous.”*
42 A significant literature backs the idea that social policy can transform citizens – and can
work for rights and democracy (or, indeed, against it). Nor is mere money the key aspect
– but rather, how it is handed out. As Soss (1999) argues, how welfare recipients interact
with the state at the point-of-service shapes their wider beliefs about government, and
thereby their political efficacy and orientations:
“[T]hrough their experiences under a given policy design, welfare clients develop
program-specific  beliefs  about  the wisdom and efficacy of  asserting themselves.
Because clients interpret their experiences with welfare bureaucracies as evidence
of how government works more generally,  beliefs about the welfare agency and
client  involvement  become  the  basis  for  broader  political  orientations.  […]  the
views  of  government  that  citizens  develop  through  program  participation  help
explain broader patterns of political action and quiescence.” (p.363)
43 The best policies, according to these authors, are those which do not submit the recipient
to  a  constant,  stressful  and  degrading  review  regarding  their  desert  of  the  benefit.
Campbell (2003) illustrates that argument, as she shows how seniors and war veterans in
the US flourished as citizens – i.e. participated more and gained more political clout –
after they were guaranteed unconditional pensions. Social security in old age empowers
seniors because they are cast as full-blown, responsible citizens. As Ingram and Schneider
(1993:89) note, the ‘social construction’ of target groups for state benefits casts some as
passive-dependent  and  others  as  active-deserving.  These  policy  messages  shape
recipients’ experiences, beliefs, and behaviour:
“The unvarying experience people have with policy informs them of their status as
citizens  and  how  they  and  people  like  themselves  are  likely  to  be  treated  by
government. Such information becomes internalized. These continually reiterated
messages people receive tell them whether they are viewed as active participants in
government and bureaucracy or whether they are passive recipients in the process.
Experience  with  policy  tells  people  whether  they  need  to  deal  directly  with
government and bureaucracy as individuals to press their own claims, or whether
they can join with others in solving problems collectively for the common good.”20
44 Unfortunately,  social  policy  can also  have  detrimental  effects  on citizenship.  Auyero
(2012)  demonstrates  this  flipside  by  showing  how  the neutral  and  seemingly  ‘fair’
bureaucratic Argentine state uses technology and delay to control, demobilise and stress
poor  populations.  On the  basis  of  his  ethnographic  observation of  welfare  offices  in
Buenos Aires, Auyero argues that the poor are moulded into ‘patients of the state’ (in all
senses of the term) by a combination of ever-changing and unclear instructions, as well as
by repeated and interminable waits for assistance. The arbitrariness and slowness of the
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process  teaches  claimants  that  they  are  impotent  and unimportant  witnesses  to  the
operations of  a Kafkaesque machine,  left  to do little else than to wait  for vital  state
benevolence to finally appear (or not), like Godot on Beckett’s stage. Although some kind
of  support  is  usually  and  ultimately  granted,  the  process  inhibits  collective  action,
participation,  and  feelings  of  dignified  citizenry.  As  Ingram and  Schneider  (1993:89)
muse, “the long lines in front of welfare offices that are frequently closed tell dependents
more about government than short lines for the voting booth.”
45 Unfortunately,  as  a  week  of  non-participant  observation  at  the  main  Bolsa  Família
registration  facility  in  Recife  revealed,  the  treatment  experienced  by  Bolsa  Família
beneficiaries mirrors that of Auyero’s Argentinian poor more than that of Campbell’s
American seniors. Bolsa Família claimants are not always explained the program, often
fear being cut off for some fault of theirs or of the system’s, and sometimes have to sleep
outside the registration facility in order to even be attended to. The constant stress this
generates dominates the minds of many recipients. The following accounts, by claimants
and beneficiaries waiting to be attended to, illustrate the burdens of the process:
“Look at the site in which we are: everything is wet, everything is dirty… mud… it’s
all dirty… this is horrible... it needs to improve more”* (Gabriela) 
“Last time I went I had to sleep there... I slept, I left at ten at night to be attended at
nine in the morning the next day…”* (Elisabeth)
“I left the house at half past four [am], got here around ten to six, twenty to six.
From there I drew the number 110. I’m still waiting… Many people. Already many...
you spend the entire day”* (Cristina)
“Many people come here, but don’t bring the right document and there they go
back, and have to come back again. It’s really bad, you have to leave at four in the
morning… Four in the morning, I’m still here. A lot of time.”* (Mariana)
“I left at five in the morning. They only renew if you have all the documents. If not,
you have to come another day… It’s, like, a bit complicated. And for me, after the
first registration, it took a year.”* (Rosana)
“It’s a lot of bureaucracy, there, for us to be able to do this registration... I already
came here, but they told me I needed the certificate, in my name, so there, I went
after it, in the residency association, picked it up there, now I am back here”* (
Andrea)
46 As long as this is the case, the Bolsa Família will arguably not reach its full capacity in
terms  of  empowering  Brazil’s  most  vulnerable  citizens.  After  all,  given  the  efforts
required to get  the Bolsa Família,  the benefit  is  unlikely to feel  like much of  a right.
Instead, as Ahlert (2013:73) notes on the basis of her own interviews, it often feels more
like the product of a protracted battle with the state:
“These difficulties [...] characterize the idea of a struggle [‘luta’] to get the benefit.
The interlocutors during the research […] understand the obtention of the Bolsa
Família as a part of the struggle they are engaged in with the State based on their
living conditions”*
47 Consequently,  the  process  is  unlikely  to  make  claimants  feel  like  rights-bearers  and
citizens:
Interviewer Do you feel like a citizen?
Beneficiary Sometimes. Sometimes not. In relation, for example, to chasing after
things [‘correr atrás’]… (Andrea)*
48 This  image  of  correr  atrás,  of  chasing  or  running  behind,  was  used  frequently  by
interviewees in Recife,  and captures the tiring aspect of the Bolsa Família registration
process. What the poor previously expected to be given from the corrupt but ‘cordial’
local patron (cf. Holanda 1936), they now have to implore from the fair but impersonal
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state.  Some  have  even  openly  question  whether  such  a  transformation  necessarily
constitutes  an  improvement,  since  clientelistic  interactions  involve  “intimate
exchanges”, a “mutual sympathy and vulnerability” and a “shared humanity” which the
cold and computerised welfare state lacks (Ansell 2014:194; Auyero 2012; Gay 1998:16). As
Robert  K.  Merton (1949:74)  noted,  the  political  machine “fulfils  the  important  social
function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of assistance to those in need”.
49 However,  all  this  alleged  ‘humanity’  of  clientelism  does  not  erase  its  unequal  and
dominating  nature.  One  can  simultaneously  defend  poor  people’s  involvement  in
clientelistic networks, arguing that “if we were in [their] shoes we would doubtless be and
think just like [them]” (Auyero 1999:312), and criticise clientelism by noting that “the
solutions, services, and protection provided by brokers [...] are inclined to legitimate a de
facto  state  of  affairs  that  is  an  unequal  balance  of  power”  (ibid,  p.324-5).  After  all,
patron’s efforts are dedicated to ‘obscuring’ the fact that an exchange is even taking
place. Brokers rarely request their clients to reciprocate, as favours are masqueraded as
generosity and hierarchy hides behind kindness (Auyero 2001;  Bourdieu,  1996;  Mauss
1923; Sales 1994a).
50 Overall,  then,  clientelism  is  deleterious  to  democratic  citizenship.  One  sign  is  that,
perversely, it works best when inequalities are the greatest, because the powerful have
the  most  to  lose  from change,  and  the  poor  are  the  least  capable  of  refusing  side-
payments. Whilst the buying of support may constitute an improvement over its violent
commanding in the past (Scott 1969),21 and whilst the local benefits of clientelism might
be real when state services are poor, these advantages are likely to pale relative to those
of an effective welfare state (Stokes et al. 2013).
 
5. Conclusion
51 In conclusion, social policy does not simply have economic or electoral effects, but can be
the engine of a more sustained transformation which promotes an inclusive, democratic
citizenship,  and  demotes  conservative-traditional  patrons  who  have  long  controlled
politics.
52 This article in particular has made several points. For one, it has showed that the Bolsa
Família has  substantially  changed the  lives  of  its  beneficiaries,  in  ways  borne out  in
existing scholarship,  third-party data,  and qualitative interviews conducted in Recife.
Accordingly, it has suggested that such changes in one’s economic realities may induce
changes in political  realities,  after having shown that the Bolsa Família is  not itself  a
clientelistic program. Finally, the text has outlined avenues in which the program may
affect citizenship, sometimes in detrimental ways.
53 The idea that social policies like the Bolsa Família may interact with patterns of clientelism
is, admittedly, not entirely knew. As we saw, Rêgo has suggested that “The colonel lost
weight” due to the Bolsa Família. Other authors have made similar statements: “the [Bolsa
Família]  program contributed  to  the  decline  of  dominant  state  political  machines  in
Brazil’s North and Northeast” (Nichter 2014b:135); “the Bolsa Família […] transformed the
norms and expectations of beneficiaries toward other state-run programs and undercut
the  basis  for  patronage  politics  in  Northeast  Brazil”  (Sugiyama  &  Hunter  2009:30).
However, these claims remained conjectures, backed by indirect or limited evidence.22 As
Weitz-Shapiro confides:
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“[T]he question of exactly how and why these [CCT] programs have succeeded in
breaking with clientelism is not a settled one” (Weitz-Shapiro 2014:73)
54 Indeed,  the  matter  remains  somewhat  unclear.  This  article  itself  has  not  offered
fundamental,  transformative  evidence  that  the  Bolsa  Família has  indeed  decisively
undermined traditional  patrons.  However,  it  has hinted at the existence of  dynamics
which have been recognized even by patrons themselves (in the words of the interviewed
community leader cited in section 3). 
55 Ultimately,  the paper closes on two confident and optimistic notes.  The first  is  that,
although the Bolsa Família in all evidence does not eradicate clientelism, it is likely to
undermine  its  ‘worst’  forms.  As  interviewees  noted,  when  clientelism  is  driven  by
material need, patrons exploit clients’ necessity. Since the Bolsa Família reduces extreme
poverty and hunger, it makes clients’ decisions more meaningful and autonomous. At the
same time, it introduces competition for patrons’ favours: their assistance and support
needs to be all  the more dedicated and valuable to gain the support  of  Bolsa Família
recipients.  This  is  good  news  in  the  long-run,  because  the  rising  cost  and  falling
effectiveness of local brokers is one of the reasons party leaders decide to switch from
clientelistic to programmatic appeals (Stokes et al. 2013). 
56 The second piece of good news is that in Brazil at least, the Bolsa Família may only be the
tip of the iceberg.  Although the program contributes its small  share,  the bulk of the
transformation is arguably carried by a combination of three processes. The first is the
recent Brasil Sem Miséria (Brazil Without Misery, BSM) agenda, a comprehensive social
assistance policy that aims to finally eradicate extreme poverty, and goes beyond cash
transfers  (Fenwick  2014).  The  second  is  the  general,  growth-  and  policy-driven
transformation in the lives of poor Brazilians, which has lifted millions out of poverty and
into formal jobs (Birdsall, Lustig & McLeod 2011). The third, finally, is the rising level of
electoral competition in the Northeast, which partly derives from the former factors, but
also further limits patrons’ access to resources (Borges 2007). 
57 The Bolsa Família is therefore part of a larger changing socio-economic context. While it
cannot end clientelism alone, it reinforces other factors that together favour patrons’
decline. Whether this decline is terminal cannot here be asserted with certainty; but as
conservative parties continue to see their support across the Northeast erode (Borges
2011; Lloyd 2012; Montero 2012), and as some historically conservative governorships slip
into the hand of the opposition (such as for the first time ever in 2014, Maranhão to the
Communist  Party),  traditional  patrons,  facing  ever-fewer  resources  and  ever-more
competition, have reason to worry. 
58 Of course, none of the above transformations have resolved the current and historical
problems  of  poverty,  injustice  and  violence  in  Brazil,  nor  do  they  augur  an  era  of
enlightened  electoral  politics  free  of  the  inevitable  influence  of  power,  money,  and
interest. However, “In Brazil, a better-being has taken hold” (Duraud 2010). Clientelism is
on  the  decline,  and  social  programs  are  pulling  an  important  weight  in  this
transformation.
59 Can  these  tentative  insights  from  the  Bolsa  Família,  and  indeed  from  the  particular
contexts  that  are  the  Brazilian  Northeast  in  general  and  Recife  in  particular,  be
generalized  to  other  regions,  and  other  CCTs?  This  paper  has  not  systematically
investigated this  question,  despite,  perhaps,  claiming so  in  its  title.  It  has,  however,
tightly nested its exploration of the Bolsa Família’s effects in Recife in scholarship about
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other social programs and societies: clientelism in Colombia (Escobar), CCTs in Mexico (De
la O 2013),  state welfare in Argentina (Auyero),  American social assistance (Campbell,
Soss) and 19th-century vote-buying in the US (Stokes et al.).  By closely focusing on a
highly particular case, the paper has attempted to open a new avenue for explanation and
interpretation  in  the  struggle  for  inclusive  citizenship.  Daieff  (2015b)  unpacks  the
citizenship-building aspects of ‘cash transfers’ and ‘conditionalities’ – rather than simply
of the Bolsa Família – and builds a broader-based argument for the transformative power
of CCTs. In doing so, the usual caveats apply: for CCTs to do what the Bolsa Família may be
slowly doing in Recife,  they need to be long-lasting;  well-administered;  supported by
broader social transformation; and built with citizens, as partners, in mind. The Bolsa
Família and Recife do not live up to all of these conditions, as indeed do few CCTs; but to
the extent that they strive for these aims, this chapter suggests that programmatic social 
policies – such as CCTs – can contribute to the making of programmatic social polities, in
Latin America, and elsewhere.
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NOTES
1.  For instance, Auyero (1999:302) notes that “one of the available means of satisfying the poor's
basic needs for food and health care is through the political party”. See also Ansell & Mitchell
2011:299; Borges 2007, 2011; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2003:19-20; Grimes & Wängnerud 2010:676,
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688; Lloyd 2012; Nichter 2011a:11; Osterkatz 2012:6. Conversely, the ‘transitions from clientelism’
literature  argues  that  increased  wealth  undermines  patrons,  as  modernisation  theory  would
predict (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012).
2. Depending on number and age of children, households who are below a certain poverty line
are eligible to receive R$77-337 monthly if their children attend school and health check-ups
regularly (US$ ~30-135 in early 2015, plus extra amounts if the children are particularly young or
the family particularly poor). The money reaches families directly via special debit cards which
are  usually  in  the  name  of  the  female  head  of  household,  and  allow  cash  withdrawals  at
government-run ATMs. Transfers can go on for many years, until all children are eighteen.
3.  The 51.5 / 80 / 51 data is, respectively, from Rocha (2013:200), Barbosa (2011:86), and Nichter
(2011:7). 
4.  After the 2010 election, 86% of respondents to a nationally representative survey approved
specifically of the Bolsa Família (Ames et al. 2010).
5.  The clientelism/citizenship dichotomy has admittedly been criticised for being simplistic and
unhelpful (e.g. Escobar 2002; Hilgers 2012). This is a valuable point, but for the sake of brevity it
is not further elaborated on here.
6.  Diffuse  loyalty  may or  may not  occasionally  involve  spot  exchanges.  Even if  it  does,  the
continuous interaction which surrounds these exchanges confers a  different meaning on the
exchange than if  it  were a one-off  occurrence,  even though the act  may look the same to a
passing observer. In turn, frequent spot exchanges can, but do not necessarily, imply or merge
into a diffuse loyalty, any more than always buying one’s bread at the same bakery means does
not necessarily lead to a good (or any) relationship with the baker.
7.  Notwithstanding the fact that ‘patrons’  often sponsor communal events,  such as lotteries,
concerts, parties, etc.
8.  Scholars disagree on how far the sociologist should depart from the client’s view about these
relationships, and do so for different reasons. For a case that the clients’ views should be taken
seriously  and that  patrons’  friendliness  matters,  see Ansell  (2014).  For  a  similar  view,  which
further argues that clientelism may not always be harmful to democracy, see Hilgers (2009; 2012).
For an author who describes clients’  views, but then re-analyses them in a more critical and
broader context, see Auyero (1999). On the other side of the debate: for an author who stresses
the inherent dependence and false consciousness involved in exchanges between the rich and
the  poor,  see  Scheper-Hughes  (1993).  Finally,  for  a  classic  Brazilian  essay  which  roundly
condemns any kind of clientelism, as well as the myth of the ‘cordial boss’ and the fetishization
of ‘social equality’ in unequal societies, see Sales (1994).
9.  This mirrors Hunter & Sugiyama’s 2009 focus groups in municipalities neighbouring Recife,
during which most participants freely and willingly acknowledged the practice of vote-buying. 
10.  This  differs  from  the  region  of  Sucre,  Colombia,  where,  as Escobar  (2002:39)  describes,
“people believe that selling their vote is a right they have”. Only one interviewee in Recife made
claims going in this direction.
11.  This mirrors the spirit of the opening quote to Vincente’s (2014) paper on vote-buying in Saõ
Tomé and Principe: “We do like vote-buying. It is essential. That is the only way we have to see
anything  good  coming  from  the  politicians.  Anyway,  I  can  vote  for  whoever  I  want.”
(anonymous, Saõ Tomé).
12.  All translations into English are mine unless otherwise indicated, and are marked by a star
[*]. Interviewed beneficiaries are referred to by underlined names, which have been modified
whenever anonymity was requested.
13.  “O coronel perdeu peso porque ela adquiriu uma liberdade que não tinha. Não precise ir ao
prefeito.  Pode  pedir  uma  rua  melhor,  mas  não  comida,  que  era  por  ai  que  o  coronelismo
funcionava”. Quoted from Lucena (2013).
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14.  Original data sources: for poverty and extreme poverty figures since 2011, see CAISAN (2014);
for extreme poverty since 2001, see IPEA (2014). Of course, the key question is how much of this
fall can be attributed to the BF. On the one hand, estimates of the BF’s impact on poverty have
been surprisingly small. Soares (2012), who reviews several studies, attributes to the program a
fall in absolute poverty of only 1.64% (from 21.7 to 20%, a relative reduction of 8%). Indeed, he
notes that the BF appears to have more successfully reduced inequality than poverty! Similarly,
Da Dalt (2013) shows that very few BF recipients have transitioned into the middle class. On the
other  hand,  Soares  (2012)  shows that  the  program has  contributed an 18% reduction in  the
poverty gap (the average distance between the poor’s income and the poverty line), and an even
slightly greater reduction in the severity of poverty (which weighs progress at the bottom of the
distribution more heavily). However, even these estimates likely underestimate the BF’s impact
on poverty because of lags in data collection. Soares’ 2012 paper rests on a 2009 study using 2006
data (Soares & Satyro 2009:27). Since then, however, the BF has been running for trice the time,
has greatly expanded the number of its beneficiaries,  and has steadily increased its benefits:
under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014), the average transfer has risen 44% in real terms (MDS 2014).
Thus, although the BF may not have propelled families above the poverty line, it has pulled them
some way away from the worst destitution (Bither‐Terry 2014). Moreover, some of CCT’s effects
here may lie in the future: in Mexico, Gertler et al. (2012:164) find that CCT recipients ‘invest’ 26%
of their transfers, which allows beneficiaries “to attain higher living standards that are sustained
even after transitioning off the program”.
15.  As a 1835 report cited by Stokes et al. (2013:201) suggests, using Christmas Gifts as a way of
‘influencing the votes  of  the poorer classes’  was a  practice already common in 19th-century
England.
16.  Even  proponents  of  the  ‘clientelistic  continuity’  hypothesis  have  slowly  acknowledged
change in the Northeast.  Whereas Montero’s 2010 article was titled “No Country for Leftists:
Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast”, his 2012 paper was titled “A
Reversal of Political Fortune. The Transitional Dynamics of Conservative Rule in the Brazilian
Northeast”. By 2012, he came around to emphasising change over continuity in the Northeast.
17.  This includes: the building of CRASs (local social assistance centres) across the country, the
Bolsa Família program and more recent upgrades (e.g. Brasil Sem Miseria, Brazil Without Misery),
repeated raises in the minimum wage, free public job training courses, university quotas and
scholarships, the significant drop in effective school costs, and more. The 1988 constitution also
created free health and social assistance services. Although quality and coverage were initially
poor, interviewees in Recife suggested they have gradually improved.
18.  Original  quote:  "a burocratização do poder e a extensão dos benefícios sociais ao campo
constituem um processo de nation-building, na medida em que fomentam uma nova identidade
social em substituição àquela tradicionalmente baseada na lealdade local" (Reis 1988:203-4).
19.  Foucault might not disagree, although he may not be as sanguine about the process and its
consequences.
20.  Similarly,  Schram  (1995)  emphasises  the  important  role  that  ‘words  of  welfare’  play  in
shaping both beneficiaries’ realities, and that of society around them.
21.  As  Stokes  et  al.  (2013)  note:  “Several  studies  underscore  the  progressive  elements  of
clientelist social and political relations, in comparison with relations of utter dependence and
intimidation that they are assumed to displace. Scott’s [1969] classic study of machine politics
locate it at an intermediate stage of social development. A prior stage is one in which subordinate
actors follow the dictates of their superiors, treating them with deference and subservience. By
contrast, the political machine has almost democratic features. At the stage of development in
which machines supplant landlords and notables, erstwhile dependents become clients who must
be paid for their political support”.
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22.  Rêgo  &  Pinzani  (2013a)  come  closest  to  actually  investigating  the  matter,  having
encountered a general sense of liberation in their qualitative interviews with rural BF recipients
across the poorest areas of Brazil. Ultimately, however, their book devotes little time or attention
to clientelism, coronelismo, or changes in the ‘politics of the poor’, and focusses more broadly on
gender, autonomy and empowerment.
ABSTRACTS
Can conditional cash transfers (CCTs) – a popular form of social programs across Latin America
and the world – transform poor people’s politics, and foster inclusive citizenship? This paper sets
out to explore the interconnections between state intervention, clientelism, and citizenship, on
the  basis  of  in-depth  qualitative  fieldwork  in  Recife,  Northeast  Brazil,  a  region  historically
marked  by  strong  patron-client  relationships.  Through  conversations  with  recipients  and
administrators of the Bolsa Família program, the world’s largest CCT, the paper first refutes the
idea that  CCTs are themselves a  form of  vote-buying,  and goes on to suggest  that  they may
instead  be  contributing  to  the  decline  of  clientelistic  politics.  The  paper  then  turns  to  the
question  of  whether  the  Bolsa  Família may,  in  Recife,  be  fostering  a  new  form  of  inclusive
citizenship for beneficiaries,  and explores competing considerations. It  closes on a cautiously
optimistic note, and briefly considers the implications for CCTs in other countries and contexts.
Les  transferts  conditionnels  en espèces  (TCEs)  -  une forme de programme social  répandue à
travers l’Amérique Latine et le monde – peuvent-ils transformer la vie politique des pauvres, et
favoriser une citoyenneté inclusive? Cet article explore les interconnexions entre les politiques
d'État, le clientélisme et la citoyenneté, sur la base d’un travail de terrain à Recife, dans un Nord-
Est brésilien historiquement marqué par un fort clientélisme. À travers des conversations avec
bénéficiaires et  administrateurs du programme Bolsa Família,  le  plus grand TCE du monde, le
chapitre  réfute  d'abord  l'idée  que  les  TCEs  sont  eux-mêmes  une  forme  d'achat  de  votes,  et
suggère  au  contraire  qu'ils  peuvent  plutôt  contribuer  au  déclin  du  clientélisme.  L’article
s’interroge ensuite sur le potentiel du Bolsa Família à favoriser une nouvelle forme de citoyenneté
pour les bénéficiaires de Recife, et explore diverses hypothèses. Il conclut, finalement, sur une
note prudemment optimiste, et examine brièvement les implications pour les TCEs dans d'autres
pays et contextes.
INDEX
Mots-clés: politique sociale, transferts conditionnels en espèces, clientélisme, citoyenneté,
Brésil
Keywords: social policy, conditional cash transfers, clientelism, citizenship, Brazil
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